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Repeated Discovery Misrepresentations Spark Novel Sanctions Review

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n discussing the evolving body of law about discovery of electronically stored information (ESI), we have often highlighted court decisions in which judges have ordered discovery-related sanctions under either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) for the failure to comply with a court order or 37(e) for the failure to preserve ESI.

In a recent decision, however, a court took a novel direction when analyzing the rules that govern discovery sanctions. After repeated misrepresentations by a party and numerous motions to compel, a magistrate judge, in addition to Rule 37(b), relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5), which authorizes monetary sanctions when a motion to compel is granted or when requested discovery is provided after a movant has filed.

'Hedgeye Risk Mgmt. v. Dale'

During discovery in *Hedgeye Risk Mgmt. v. Dale*, 2023 WL 4760581 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2023), the defendants had sought from plaintiff Hedgeye "responsive communications, including text messages, from Hedgeye's executives." Dissatisfied with Hedgeye's efforts, on Feb. 18, 2022, the defendants moved to compel production. The







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court denied the motion after Hedgeye "represented to the court that it had 'investigated and collected and produced' responsive messages and was working 'diligently' to produce the rest."

Two months later, on April 18, 2022, defendants again moved to compel, arguing that Hedgeye had not produced communications where it's CEO had made comments about the defendant. "In response, Hedgeye assured the Court that Hedgeye had remedied the deficiency."

At a hearing on April 28, 2022, "Hedgeye's counsel confirmed that Hedgeye had produced 'all communications between . . . top Hedgeye executives and any third party concerning Mr. Dale or this litigation." The court explained that "[a] gain based on Hedgeye's representations, the court issued an order directing that Hedgeye 'shall produce to the defendant all communications from Hedgeye executives to third parties concerning Defendant Dale or the instant litigation. At the hearing, the plaintiff represented that it had done so."

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Nearly a year later, on April 17, 2023, the plaintiff's counsel once again represented that Hedgeye had "produced all communications with third parties relating to the lawsuit that it has located after a reasonable search." But third-party productions "revealed the existence of text messages that had not been produced by Hedgeye," leading to the defendants filing another motion to compel.

In response, the plaintiff repeated its prior stance, insisting "that it had fully complied with its obligation by having undertaken 'a carefully considered, reasonably diligent text message collection process to locate responsive text messages,' while at the same time stating it was 'undertaking yet another search of its executives' text messages.'"

May 11 Hearing, et seq.

During a hearing on May 11, 2023, addressing the defendants' most recent motion to compel, Hedgeye's counsel maintained that the plaintiff "did an extensive search of the top . . . seven executives who might have had interactions with [Defendant Dale] and might have had things to say about him. We've produced everything."

Under questioning by the court, though, "it came to light that Hedgeye itself, not its outside counsel, had conducted searches[,] notwithstanding that Hedgeye's in-house counsel is a witness in this case and reports to [the CEO and another executive], who have a direct interest in the case." Additional questioning by the court raised issues concerning the level of quality control exercised by outside counsel into Hedgeye's self-collection efforts.

The court directed the parties to meet and confer to resolve issues. This led to defendants filing another motion, "to compel a thorough search of Hedgeye executives' laptop computers, which Hedgeye apparently had not done at all."

When the plaintiff suggested it would only proceed with the search upon cost-shifting any associated expenses, the court, on June 21, 2023, ordered the requested search "at Hedgeye's expense with the potential to recoup costs depending on whether the search yielded duplicative documents."

Shortly thereafter, according to the defendants, Hedgeye produced "thousands of new documents, including hundreds of text and Slack messages the defendants had never seen before." As noted by the court, this production



included "precisely the type of messages that Hedgeye had been ordered to produce in April 2022 and that Hedgeye repeatedly represented had been produced."

Perhaps not surprisingly, defendants then moved for sanctions against Hedgeye for its "failure to comply with its discovery obligations, failure to obey this court's order . . . , and repeated misrepresentations that Hedgeye had produced all . . . communications [at issue]."

Motion for Sanctions; Rules 37(a)(5) and 37(b)(2)

The defendants sought sanctions against Hedgeye under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) for failure to comply with the court's April 28, 2022 order. The court, though, began its discussion by, sua sponte, expanding the poten-

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tially applicable rules, stating that "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 authorizes a court to impose sanctions for conduct in discovery, including when a party fails to make required disclosures, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5), and when a party violates a discovery order, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). Although the defendants invoked only the latter in asking for sanctions, both provisions are applicable[.]"

The court explained that "[a] sanction under Rule 37(a)(5) does not require violation of a court order; '[r]ather, a court must order a sanction under Rule 37(a)(5) if it is forced to grant a motion to compel discovery or the requested discovery is provided after such a motion was filed." It found that the many representations by Hedgeye as to the sufficiency of its discovery efforts "proved to be inaccurate" and that "it became apparent that Hedgeye had not exercised sufficient quality control over the collection process."

Thus, since "Hedgeye's faulty discovery and inaccurate representations were not substantially justified, and no other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust[,]... the court 'must' order Hedgeye to pay the defendants' reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, in moving to compel production of all communications from Hedgeye executives to third parties concerning Defendant Dale or the instant litigation."

The court noted that Rule 37(b)(2) "governs sanctions that may be imposed when a party violates a court order," including when a party "fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery." It determined that sanctions requiring Hedgeye to pay defendants' expenses, including attorney's fees, would also be appropriate under this rule, for its "failure to comply with the court's order dated April 28, 2022 providing that Hedgeye 'shall produce to Defendant all communications from Hedgeye executives to third parties concerning Defendant Dale or the instant litigation."

Detailing its rationale, the court explained that while there was no "direct evidence of willful misconduct, Hedgeye's conduct was hardly innocent and was more than negligent. Hedgeye repeatedly misrepresented the extent of its compliance with the court's April 28, 2022 order. . . . And, counsel failed to exercise sufficient quality control over collection by Hedgeye's personnel." (citations omitted).

In sum, the court determined that "pursuant to either Rule 37(a)(5)(A) or 37(b)(2) or both, Hedgeye's conduct warrants, indeed requires, reimbursement of Defendants' reasonable expenses in moving to compel complete disclosure of all communications from Hedgeye executives to third parties concerning Defendant Dale or the instant litigation."

Lessons Learned

In *Hedgeye*, Magistrate Judge Robert Lehrburger offers a cautionary tale of discovery conduct and a reminder of the importance of ensuring the sufficiency of discovery efforts in what continues to be a complex and evolving area of law. His decision in Hedgeye is instructive in a number of ways.

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First, courts expect parties and their counsel to exercise due diligence and quality control in the discovery process. Here, the court found these lacking, especially with respect to the self-collection conducted by the plaintiff. Parties should expect a higher level of scrutiny under such circumstances. And here, as we have seen in other situations, the production of a third party clearly demonstrated the insufficiency of a party's discovery collection efforts.

Second, parties and their counsel should carefully consider their representations to courts and adversaries regarding their compliance with discovery obligations and orders. Here, incorrect representations led only to monetary sanctions; in other circumstances, though, parties might be subject to more severe sanctions under Rule 37 or even be found in violation of the certification requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g).

And third, discovery law and practice continue to evolve, and even to surprise. In *Hedgeye*, the court's novel, unexpected use of Rule 37(a)(5) in its sanctions analysis—in conjunction with the more traditional analysis under Rule 37(b) (2)—helped to highlight the specific deficiencies in plaintiff's discharge of its discovery obligations under the Federal Rules and underscored the court's resolve to hold the plaintiff accountable for its discovery conduct.