February 03, 2026

Supreme Court to Address Constitutionality of Geofence Warrants for the First Time

Practices & Industries

Lawyers

On January 16, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court in Chatrie v. United States agreed to review the constitutionality of “geofence warrants,” or court orders that require “a service provider to produce location data from cell phone users who were near the scene when a crime occurred.”[1] Federal courts of appeal are split over the constitutionality of such warrants. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case could have far-reaching implications for data privacy standards, law enforcement practices, and the processes by which technology and telecommunications companies manage user location data.

Key Takeaways

First review of geofence warrants. This is the Supreme Court’s first review of geofence warrants, a step that signals the potential for further scrutiny of law enforcement techniques aimed at bulk data collection.
Fork in the road for law enforcement. A decision holding that geofence warrants violate the Fourth Amendment, or otherwise limiting their use, could limit law enforcement’s ability to obtain individuals’ location information from private companies, while a decision authorizing geofence warrants could signal a more permissive approach to law enforcement searches of data held in the cloud by technology companies.
Government access to data collected and maintained by private enterprise. The case will give the Supreme Court a chance to weigh in on a facet of the growing public policy debate around the sensitive customer information collected and maintained by private companies, the regulations governing the collection of such information, and on the government’s ability to access it to investigate violations of law.

Background: What Are Geofence Warrants?

Geofence warrants, also known as reverse location warrants, allow law enforcement to compel tech companies that collect and maintain location data about their users, such as some email and cloud service providers, to provide identifying information about their users appearing within a defined geographical area during a specified time window. Law enforcement’s use of these types of warrants has grown rapidly in recent years, and has led to criticism because of the unique privacy concerns that they raise.

Unlike traditional warrants, a geofence warrant does not name a particular person or device to be searched. For example, a geofence warrant could require a tech company to identify all of its users located within 1,000 yards of the location of an alleged crime within a one-hour period bracketing the time when the crime was believed to have been committed. By casting a wide net, geofence warrants can help law enforcement identify potential suspects, but they do so by sweeping in data from many people with no connection to a crime, raising privacy concerns.[2]

The Case Before the Court: Chatrie v. United States

Chatrie v. United States arises from a 2019 bank robbery investigation in Virginia.[3] Police obtained a geofence warrant covering the area near the bank during a two-hour window bracketing the time of the alleged robbery. The service provider’s response to the geofence warrant proceeded in three stages. First, the service provider produced anonymized location and movement information associated with each of the devices for its users within the geofence. Second, law enforcement reviewed the anonymized production and identified “devices of interest,” for which the service provider offered additional contextual location information. Finally, based on this additional context, law enforcement narrowed the list of suspicious devices then compelled the company to reveal identifying subscriber information for three users.[4] The defendant, Okello Chatrie, was identified through this process and arrested after police found stolen cash and a firearm in his home.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the government had not conducted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment by using the geofence warrant because Chatrie had voluntarily exposed his data to the service provider.[5] Upon rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit issued nine separate opinions on the underlying constitutionality of the practice, ultimately affirming solely on the basis that the evidence should not be suppressed in light of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

In a subsequent decision in a later case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court was presented with a similar case regarding the constitutional implications of a geofence warrant and rejected the Fourth Circuit panel’s conclusion that “geofencing is not a ‘search’ subject to the Fourth Amendment.”[6] The disagreement between the Fourth and Fifth Circuit decisions set up a split that the Supreme Court may resolve.

On January 16, 2026, the Supreme Court granted Chatrie’s request to consider his case and agreed to answer a single question: “Whether the execution of the geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.”[7] This grants the Court an opportunity to resolve the uncertainty over these warrants’ constitutionality.

In seeking Supreme Court review, Chatrie targeted the multi-stage process used to execute a geofence warrant, arguing that the government’s use and execution of the geofence warrant constituted a Fourth Amendment search and that the warrant and its execution were unconstitutional because they lacked probable cause and particularity, specifically because officers de-anonymized devices without obtaining a second warrant or any intervening judicial review.[8] The Government, on the other hand, argued there was no Fourth Amendment “search” because users voluntarily opted into the service provider’s location history and the warrant sought only a narrow amount of data that was limited by time and location.[9]

Implications for Technology and Telecom Companies

A Supreme Court decision about the constitutionality of geofence warrants could affect companies that collect or hold user location data—especially tech companies, app developers, and telecommunications providers.

Impact on geofence warrants. If the Court rules that the execution of the geofence warrant at issue in Chatrie violates the Fourth Amendment, the decision could reshape law enforcement’s procedures for obtaining location information as part of a criminal investigation, while a decision upholding the use of geofence warrants would allow law enforcement to continue using the tool.
Broader effects. Supreme Court decisions often have implications that extend beyond the factual and legal issues presented in an individual case. The reasoning the Court uses to reach its decision could be just as important, if not more, than the decision the Court makes in the case. The Court’s application of Fourth Amendment principles to location data collected by and stored on a private company’s servers could have significant implications for how courts understand and protect individual privacy interests in such data.
- For example, a ruling that limits geofence warrants could also call into question other investigative tools such as keyword warrants—where a company might be asked to identify anyone who searched certain terms—or other surveillance orders.^[10] The decision could create opportunities for companies to consider challenging these and other forms of legal process used by law enforcement.
- By contrast, a ruling that limits judicial review of geofence warrants could spur calls for legislative action to limit their use.
Industry practice. Depending on the outcome and the reasoning of the decision, technology and telecommunications companies may consider reassessing their policies and practices around the collection and storage of location and other sensitive information about individual users. Options may include storing users’ location history only on a user’s device (not in the cloud) and shortening the time period for which such data is retained. There is already evidence that some companies have taken law enforcement’s use of geofence warrants to obtain user location information into account in developing products and delivering services to users.
- For example, one major technology company has stated in its public transparency reports that while it has received geofence warrants, it does not maintain any data to provide in response to geofence warrants.
- Another major technology company announced changes to its location data practices specifically to blunt geofence requests in 2023.

Looking Ahead

If Chatrie is heard this term, the Supreme Court’s decision could be issued by June 2026. This case has far reaching implications. In preparation for the decision, technology and telecommunications companies can take this opportunity to assess their current approach to handling such data and responding to law enforcement requests and consider how the decision might affect that approach going forward.

Companies can consider auditing how they collect, store, and share location data and evaluate data minimization practices (e.g., shorter retention periods, on-device storage).
Companies can consider developing or updating standard operating procedures for handling government data requests, including by training or refreshing legal and IT teams on identifying requests that may be broader than authorized by law and establishing protocols for direct communication with the requesting agency when appropriate.
Companies can consider whether to enhance privacy governance by updating privacy notices, publishing transparency reports, or proactively engaging with law enforcement, privacy officers and regulators.

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[1] United States v. Chatrie, 136 F.4th 100, 102 (4th Cir. 2025) (Diaz, C.J., concurring), cert. granted, 2026 WL 120676 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2026) (No. 25-112).

[2] See Jackie O’Neil, Much Ado About Geofence Warrants, Harvard Law Review (Feb. 18, 2025), available here.

[3] See United States v. Chatrie, 107 F.4th 319 (4th Cir. 2024).

[4] Brief for Google LLC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, United States v. Chatrie, 590 F. Supp. 3d 901 (E.D. Va. 2022) (subsequent history omitted).

[5] United States v. Chatrie, 107 F.4th 319 (4th Cir. 2024), aff’d en banc, 136 F.4th 100 (4th Cir. 2025).

[6] United States v. Smith, 110 F.4th 817, 835 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Chatrie, 107 F.4th at 331-32).

[7] Grant of Cert., Chatrie v. United Sates, No. 25-112 (Jan. 16, 2026), available here.

[8] Petition for Writ of Cert., Chatrie, No. 25-112 (U.S. filed Nov. 24, 2025), available here.

[9] Brief for the US in Opposition, Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112 (U.S. filed Nov. 24, 2025), available here.

[10] See Reverse Search Warrants, Nat’l Ass’n Crim. Laws. (last accessed Jan. 17, 2026), available here.