On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule, which required certain plaintiffs to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a disparate treatment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.[1] The Court, citing the statutory text and precedent, ruled that the standard for proving discrimination under Title VII does not vary based on whether a plaintiff is a member of a “majority group.” This decision resolves a circuit split on the evidentiary standard for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination and mandates that courts apply the same standard to all Title VII plaintiffs.
Background
In Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, an employee (Ames), a heterosexual woman, sued her employer, the Ohio Department of Youth Services, for discrimination based on sex and sexual orientation.[2] Ames alleged two adverse employment actions in 2019. First, Ames did not receive a promotion when she applied and interviewed for a newly created management position.[3] The position was ultimately filled by another internal candidate who identified as “female and gay.”[4] Second, Ames was demoted shortly after her interview for the management position, and her previous position was filled by a gay man.[5]
Ames subsequently filed suit against her employer in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The operative complaint alleged eight causes of action, including claims for sex and sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII, hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII, age discrimination under federal and state law, and violation of due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.[6]
The District Court analyzed Ames’ Title VII claims using the three-step burden-shifting framework for Title VII disparate treatment claims established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green.[7] At the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff bears the “initial burden” of “establishing a prima facie case” by producing enough evidence to support an inference of discriminatory motive.[8] If the plaintiff clears that hurdle, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct.[9] If the employer satisfies that burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate the employer’s offered reason is merely pretext.[10]
At the time Ames commenced her lawsuit, federal courts were divided on whether plaintiffs viewed as members of a “majority group” are subject to a different evidentiary burden at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework.[11] The Sixth Circuit, and four other circuits,[12] required that majority group plaintiffs—including white or male plaintiffs[13]—provide additional “background circumstances” suggesting that their employer is an “unusual” employer that is inclined to discriminate against the majority.[14] However, in the remaining seven circuits, all plaintiffs, notwithstanding their membership in a majority group, could satisfy the prima facie burden by presenting evidence showing they “applied for an available position for which [they were] qualified, but [were] rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”[15] The Third and Eleventh Circuits went as far as expressly rejecting the “background circumstances” requirement.[16]
Applying the “background circumstances” rule, the District Court concluded that Ames failed to establish a prima facie case of sexual-orientation-based discrimination and granted summary judgment in favor of the employer.[17] The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Ames failed to proffer statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination by the employer or a showing that “a member of the relevant minority group (here, gay people) made the employment decision.”[18] Ames’ petition for certiorari followed and was granted.
Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.[19] Writing for the Court, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson held that the “background circumstances” rule was inconsistent with the text of Title VII and the Supreme Court precedent.[20] First, Title VII’s statutory language prohibiting discrimination against “any individual” based on such “individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” draws no distinction between majority and minority group plaintiffs.[21] Second, longstanding precedent establishes that Title VII does not apply a different standard based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group.[22] The Court explained that Griggs v. Duke Power Company, which provided that Title VII prohibits “[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority,”[23] and McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company, which affirmed that Title VII prohibited racial discrimination against white petitioners in that case “upon the same standards”[24] as would be applicable were they not white, reinforced its conclusion. In so holding, the Court provided that the McDonnell Douglas framework should be applied flexibly so as to avoid imposing “rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic” requirements on cases with different facts.[25] Additionally, the Court “assume[d] without deciding that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies at the summary-judgment stage of litigation” instead of expressly affirming the approach.[26]
Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Thomas, while joining the Court’s opinion in full, wrote to “highlight the problems that arise when judges create atexual legal rules and frameworks,” such as the McDonnell Douglas framework.[27] He explained that the McDonnell Douglas framework lacks any basis in the text of Title VII and makes it difficult to resolve ambiguities in a principled way.[28] Of note, Justice Thomas indicated that he “would be willing to consider whether the McDonnell Douglas framework is a workable and useful evidentiary tool.”[29]
Implications
Ames resolves the circuit split by clarifying that plaintiffs in a majority group—in terms of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin—need not show “background circumstances” demonstrating that their employer discriminates against their majority group. The Ames decision’s elimination of this additional requirement for establishing a prima facie case may make it easier for majority group plaintiffs to bring discrimination claims. Further, it will be more difficult for employers to win at summary judgment in those circuits that previously required a showing of background circumstances.
While Justice Thomas’ non-binding concurrence questioned the legitimacy of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the framework was not rejected by the majority opinion and remains controlling precedent. Still, the majority’s admonition to flexibly assess prima facie discrimination and its refusal to expressly endorse the application of the framework at the summary judgment stage suggests that the Court may be inviting lower courts to set aside a rigid or strict application of the McDonnell Douglas framework where case-specific facts demand a different approach.
Following the issuance of the Ames decision, the Acting Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), Andrea Lucas, issued a statement celebrating the Court’s ruling in Ames and highlighting Justice Thomas’ concurrence.[30] The Acting Chair stated that the EEOC “is committed to dismantling identity politics that have plagued our employment civil rights laws, by dispelling the notion that only the ‘right sort of’ plaintiff is protected by Title VII.”[31]
We will continue to monitor as case law applying the Ames decision develops.
* * *
[1] Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs, No. 23-1039, 2025 WL 1583264 (U.S. June 5, 2025) (“SCOTUS Opinion”).
[2] See id.
[3] See Ames v. Dept. of Youth Servs., 2023 WL 2539214, at *3–4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2023), aff’d sub nom. Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 87 F.4th 822 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. granted, 145 S. Ct. 118 (2024), and vacated and remanded, No. 23-1039, 2025 WL 1583264 (U.S. June 5, 2025) (“District Court Opinion”).
[4] District Court Opinion at *4.
[5] See id. at *9–10.
[6] Id. at *6.
[7] See id. at *7 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), holding modified by Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993)).
[8] SCOTUS Opinion at *3.
[9] See id.
[10] See id.
[11] Id.
[12] See Mills v. Health Care Services Corp., 171 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 1999); Hammer v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2004); Notari v. Denver Water Dep’t, 971 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
[13] SCOTUS Opinion at *8 (Thomas, J. concurring).
[14] Id. at *4.
[15] Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). The Court stated that this initial burden is not “onerous.” Id.
[16] See Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151 (3d. Cir. 1999); Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).
[17] With respect to Ames’ gender discrimination claim, the District Court held that Ames failed to create a genuine issue of fact showing that the employer’s stated reasons for demoting her were pretextual. See District Court Opinion at *12.
[18] Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 87 F.4th 822, 825 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. granted, 145 S. Ct. 118 (2024), and vacated and remanded, No. 23-1039, 2025 WL 1583264 (U.S. June 5, 2025).
[19] SCOTUS Opinion at *2.
[20] Id. at *4.
[21] Id.
[22] Id. at *4 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)).
[23] Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (emphasis added).
[24] McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
[25] SCOTUS Opinion at *4–5.
[26] Id. at *3 n.2.
[27] SCOTUS Opinion at *6 (Thomas, J. concurring).
[28] Id. at *7.
[29] Id. at *6.
[30] See EEOC, Statement from EEOC Acting Chair Andrea Lucas Celebrating the Supreme Court’s Unanimous Ruling in Ames Restoring Evenhanded Application of Title VII, available at https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/statement-eeoc-acting-chair-andrea-lucas-celebrating-supreme-courts-unanimous-ruling-ames (accessed June 11, 2025).
[31] Id.
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